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CAN DECENTRALISATION CONTRIBUTE TO PROMOTING RULE-OF-LAW 
STRUCTURES? THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, RWANDA AND 
BURUNDI AS EXAMPLES** 
 
H Hamann* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This article asks if decentralisation can contribute to strengthening rule-of-law struc-
tures and – if so – what conditions need to be created to ensure that these are effec-
tive and stable. It will also address how this can be influenced by the actions of inter-
national players and raise questions on the interplay between international law, de-
centralisation and the rule-of-law. 
 
I will start with briefly defining what I mean by decentralisation and the rule of law. 
 
1.1 Decentralisation 
 
This article takes a broad definition of decentralisation as a starting point. Decentrali-
sation is defined as "the process of transferring powers from central government to 
subordinate levels of government organisation".1 
 
                                                 
** The article is the written version of a lecture given on 5 November 2011 at the annual conference 
of the African Law Society in Heidelberg. The text has been modified for this purpose. Legal de-
tails and legal literature have been added. At the same time the article maintains the structure of 
a lecture with an emphasis on the author's own thoughts. It does not constitute a complete scien-
tific research of all of the legal details referred to. 
* Hartmut Hamann. Prof. Dr, jur., Stuttgart, lawyer with focus on complex international projects and 
arbitration proceedings; lecturer on dispute resolution and international law at Freie Universität 
Berlin and Technische Universität Chemnitz Hartmut.Hamann@cms-hs.com; regularly works in 
Africa; the author thanks Claire Pillot (Master II in Corporate and Tax law (Diplôme de Juriste 
Conseil en Entreprises (DJCE)), University of Strasbourg, Trainee lawyer (Ecole Régionale des 
Avocats du Grand Est, Strasbourg)) and Yohali Vanessa Ifulu (stud. jur. Universität Tübingen) for 
their help in researching legal details. 
1 Tilch Münchener Rechts-Lexikon, reference "Dezentralisierung". 
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For the purpose of this article I will confine myself to this general definition and not 
distinguish between different types of decentralisation such as political, administra-
tive, fiscal, and sectoral decentralisation. I will not go into the French debate on dé-
centralisation, décentration und déconcentration either. 
 
1.2 The rule of law 
 
I will also briefly define what I understand by the rule of law, without debating defini-
tions.2 
 
Any society needs rules. Without rules the law of the jungle prevails. In a state of law 
the rules which are binding for everyone are of a legal nature, not religious or moral 
in nature. Breaches of rules should not go unpunished but must trigger sanctions. 
Thus an institution is necessary which has the authority to make decisions in this 
respect. If it follows the principle of the rule of law, the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of physical force will lie with the state and the state will act in accordance with 
transparent criteria and control mechanisms. This includes, as part of the separation 
of powers, an independent, impartial judiciary. Thus, state structures which are able 
to act efficiently and implement sanctions are a necessity. In the context of decen-
tralisation you can ask: when are decentralised state structures efficient? 
 
Rules and the sanctioning of breaches of rules are not enough on their own. The 
principle of the rule of law includes the obligation of law to create justice and protect 
human dignity, individual rights and freedoms. The idea of justice forms and under-
pins all law. It binds and leads to compliance with all rules by those subject to them. 
In this light the principle of the rule of law is open to taking the history, culture, needs 
and wishes of the peoples in the countries as a starting point. In the context of de-
                                                 
2 For further references see Hamann and Schroth 2011 VRÜ. 
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centralisation you can ask: when do decentralised structures encourage this element 
of the rule of law? 
 
The general definition of decentralisation given above is broad enough for it to be 
adapted to the specific circumstances in the country concerned. At the same time, 
great care must be taken in determining the starting points and the targets of decen-
tralisation in each given country. 
 
Let me start by looking at two theoretical examples which enable me to consider the 
probable effects of decentralisation on the two elements of the rule of law to which I 
referred above: the need for rules and the need to protect human rights and human 
dignity. 
 
Example no. 1: Let us make two basic assumptions: Firstly – that centralised power 
is inefficiently organised and secondly – that it is corrupt. What kind of powers will a 
state organised like this be willing and able to decentralise? Probably corruption and 
inefficiency. What implications does this have on rule of law structures? Inefficiency 
and corruption are the opposite of abiding by rules and the sanctioning of breaches 
of rules. Decentralising corruption and inefficiency will therefore not strengthen rule-
of-law structures. Whether or not and to what extent human rights and human dignity 
are guaranteed depends on the power structure, but possibly also on the organisa-
tion of the civil society and cultural, historical and political factors. A state which is 
inherently corrupt and inefficient will not be able to make an active contribution to 
protecting and promoting human rights and human dignity – neither before nor after 
decentralisation. 
 
Example no. 2: Now let us make the following two assumptions: Firstly – the central-
ised power structure is efficiently organised, and secondly – organised in a manner 
which is autocratic. Decentralisation will probably increase efficiency and the central 
power will control the decentralised units. In this second example the establishment 
of rules and the sanctioning of breaches are secured. Decentralisation will probably 
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make this even more efficient, because the entire country will then be organised right 
down to small units. However, it does not necessarily guarantee a genuine transfer 
of power and resources to decentralised units and may simply lead to more efficient 
administration which gives those who hold the reins of central power even tighter 
control of the country overall. In these circumstances, the respect for human rights 
and human dignity will probably depend largely on the goodwill of those in power and 
not on greater decentralisation. 
 
Both of the above examples make different basic assumptions. These assumptions 
lead to different consequences on what decentralisation can achieve. 
 
For an outside observer, just understanding the situation and circumstances in an 
African country in order to determine the starting points of decentralisation is ex-
tremely difficult. Indeed, in my experience it is impossible without the collaboration of 
reliable national colleagues and national co-workers. Even then, great care needs to 
be taken in developing the collaboration. This is a process which takes many years. 
Deciding on the targets of decentralisation is even more complicated. In my view this 
should be up to the national and the local population and not up to foreign players. 
Nevertheless, what can be done from the perspective of an external observer who 
has been working closely with African jurists and universities for a couple of years is 
to develop thoughts on what might help to strengthen rule-of-law structures in the 
context of decentralisation. 
 
2 What can decentralisation contribute to promoting rule-of-law structures? 
 
I assume that rule-of-law structures which really merit that name should serve the 
entire population and not just the ruling elite. 
 
Structures serve our interests best if we are able to influence them. If all of us are 
able to exert influence, this means that we have to accept responsibility. Exercising 
freedom and assuming responsibility for decisions taken in the context of freedom go 
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hand in hand. In an ideal situation, we establish the rules which we need to live in 
our community and we ensure that the members of that community respect and live 
by those rules; each one of us – not only the president or the prime minister – from 
the bottom up, and not from the top down. 
 
A village community can have a large degree of autonomy to organise itself. The 
inhabitants of a town can organise life in that town, the inhabitants of a province ex-
ercise influence at provincial level. The principle of subsidiarity can be applied sys-
tematically. If the government is organised from the bottom up there will be a sound 
basis for national structures and in the long term a basis for regional integration. 
 
Decentralisation will make a contribution to establishing rule-of-law structures if the 
population concerned is given a genuine possibility of participating and if it strength-
ens the responsibility and accountability of the individual. This can happen only if 
- those in power are willing to hand over some of the power; 
- the population is willing to assume responsibility and invest time and energy in 
developing community structures. 
Neither precondition can be taken for granted. 
 
The willingness to assume responsibility will be greater, the more elements of local 
autonomy and federal structures are incorporated in the decentralisation process. 
Decentralisation is then not merely a shift in power away from central organisation 
but it provides the population with a genuine means of influencing the way the coun-
try is run from the bottom up. Decentralisation then becomes more than the decen-
tralisation of government processes: it allows the population to take an active role in 
governing its own affairs. The motivation for taking personal responsibility makes a 
crucial difference. Should the population take an active – indeed a proactive – role in 
running its own affairs or should it merely be integrated as effectively as possible in 
the formal organisation of centralised state structures? The differences can and will 
depend on many details and many national, regional and local factors, which need to 
be identified before the process of decentralisation is started. 
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Starting points and targets can be established only in the country itself, through care-
ful examination and with a long-term perspective. This is probably true for all coun-
tries, including the three chosen examples, DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.3 
 
These three countries are chosen as examples because, on the one hand, they are 
neighbours, and on the other hand, they are very different, not just in terms of their 
size. In all three of these countries there are laws which deal with decentralisation. 
Whether or not these laws and their implementation mean that decentralisation con-
tributes to strengthening rule-of-law structures is a matter to be decided by Congo-
lese, Rwandan and Burundi jurists, as is the question of whether or not this is the 
intention. This article confines itself to a brief summary of the laws and the current 
status with regard to their implementation. 
 
3 DR Congo (DRC) 
 
3.1 Legal situation 
 
3.1.1 Constitutional framework 
 
Article 2 of the Constitution4 reads as follows: 
 
La Republique Democratique du Congo est composée de la ville de Kinshasa et de 
25 provinces dotées de la personnalité juridique. 
Ces provinces sont: Bas-Uele, Equateur, Haut-Lomami, Haut-Katanga, Haut-Uele, 
Ituri, Kasai, Kasai Oriental, Kongo central, Kwango, Kwilu, Lomami, Lualaba, Kasai 
Central, Mai-Ndombe, Maniema, Mongala, Nord-Kivu, Nord-Ubangi, Sankuru, Sud-
Kivu, Sud-Ubangi, Tanganyika, Tshopo, Tshuapa. 
 
                                                 
3 The author is working with universities in all three countries on a regular basis. Some of the re-
search results of Congolese, Burundian and Rwandan researchers have been published in KAS 
Date Unknown www.the-rule-of-law-in-africa.com. 
4 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo of 2006 (as modified by law n°11/002 of 20 
January 2011). 
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Article 3 adds: 
 
Les provinces et les entités territoriales décentralisées de la République Démocra-
tique du Congo sont dotées de la personnalité juridique et sont gérées par les or-
ganes locaux. 
Ces entités territoriales décentralisées sont la ville, la commune, le secteur et la 
chefferie. 
Elles jouissent de la libre administration et de l'autonomie de gestion de leurs res-
sources économiques, humaines, financières et techniques. 
La composition, l'organisation, le fonctionnement de ces entités territoriales décen-
tralisées ainsi que leurs rapports avec l'Etat et les provinces sont fixés par une loi 
organique. 
 
The last constitutional amendment of 20 January 2011 includes two elements which 
are important for decentralisation. It adds a new Article 226: 
 
Une loi de programmation détermine les modalités d'installation de nouvelles pro-
vinces citées à l'article 2 de la présente Constitution. 
 
Moreover, the revised versions of Articles 197 and 198 now empower the president 
to dissolve the assemblées provinciales, the legislative bodies of the provinces and 
to dismiss les gouverneurs, the governors of the provinces, in the event of a severe 
and persistent political crisis. 
 
3.1.2 Laws organising decentralisation 
 
In the year 2008 les lois organiques, the laws complementing the constitution in this 
respect, were adopted: 
- Loi organique n°08/015 du 07 octobre 2008 portant modalités d'organisation et 
de fonctionnement de la Conférence des Gouverneurs de province; 
- loi organique n°08/016 du 07 octobre 2008 portant composition, organisation et 
fonctionnement des entités territoriales décentralisées et leurs rapports avec l'Etat et 
les provinces; 
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- loi n°08/012 du 31 juillet 2008 portant principes fondamentaux relatifs à la libre 
administration des provinces.5 
 
In summary, the legal organisation is as follows6: 
 
3.1.2.1 The provinces (provinces) 
 
According to Article 2 of law n°08/012 of 31 July 2008 on core principles for the free 
administration of provinces7: 
 
La province et une composante politique et administrative du territorie de la Ré-
publique. Elle est dotée de la personnalité juridique. Elle jouit de l'autonomie de 
gestion de ses ressources humaines, économiques, financières et techniques. 
 
Article 43 of law n°8/012 also explicitly states that the budget of the provinces is dis-
tinct from the pouvoir central. Article 3 of the Constitution explicitly distinguishes 
between les provinces et les entités territoriales décentralisées, underlining the legal 
difference between those two entities. 
 
The provinces are administered by two organs: a legislative organ, assemblée pro-
vincial, and an executive organ, gouvernement provincial.8 The députés provinciaux 
are elected in direct universal vote for a five-year renewable mandate; the assem-
blée provinciale deliberates about questions falling into the province's scope of com-
petence, controls the gouvernement provincial as well as local and provincial public 
services (Article 7 of law n°08/012). The gouvernement provincial is composed of a 
gouverneur, a vice-gouverneur and ministres provinciaux. The gouverneur and the 
vice-gouverneur are elected for a five-year mandate by the députés provinciaux and 
vested by a presidential order. Ministres provinciaux are appointed and may be re-
                                                 
5  A good overview on the decentralisation process in DR Congo and on the legal framework is 
given in Mantuba-Ngoma (ed) Le processus de decentralization. 
6  For more details see Kumbu ki Ngimbi "Le cadre légal de la décentralisation" 57 ff. 
7 Law n°08/012 of 31 July 2008. 
8  Article 6 Law n°08/012 of 31 July 2008 and a 195 of the Constitution. 
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moved from office by the gouverneur. They also might be removed from office indi-
vidually or collectively by a motion de censure or a vote of défiance by the assem-
blée provincial (Aricles 23 and 28 law n°08/012). 
 
Due to its dual status of political and administrative authority, the province is submit-
ted to a double set of rules. As the head of an administrative body, "le Gouverneur 
de province représente le Gouvernement central en province. Il assure … la sauve-
garde de l'intérêt national, le respect des lois … et veille à la sécurité et à l'ordre pu-
blic" (Article 63 of law n°08/012). As such, he is accountable for his actions to the 
central government, which can cancel or modify his decisions (Articles 65 and 66 of 
law n°08/012). As a political body, the province enjoys exclusive competence in 
some matters enumerated in the Constitution (Article 204 of the Constitution). 
 
Articles 19 and 20 of law n°08/012 provide that the President of the National Assem-
bly and the President of the Senate might acknowledge the dissolution of the provin-
cial assembly and report it to the President of the DRC in the event of a persistent 
institutional crisis as defined in Article 19. 
 
Since the last constitutional amendment of 20 January 2011, Articles 197 and 198 of 
the Constitution have been revised, empowering the President to dissolve the as-
semblée provinciale, and to dismiss the gouverneur of the Province in the event of a 
severe and persistent political crisis. 
 
3.1.2.2 The decentralised territorial entities (Entités territoriales décentralisées) 
 
In accordance with Article 3 paragraph 4 of the Constitution, law n°08/016 of 7 Octo-
ber 20089 determines the composition, structure and function of decentralised territo-
rial entities and their relationship to the state and the provinces. The Legislator dis-
tinguishes two categories of decentralised territorial entities (DTE): entities without 
                                                 
9  Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008. 
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legal personality (entités territoriales déconcentrées) as the territoire, the quartier, 
the groupement and the village and territorial entities which are granted legal per-
sonality: ville, commune, secteur and chefferie (Article 5 of law n°08/016 of 7 Octo-
ber 2008). 
 
Each DTE with legal personality is administered on the same basis by two organs: a 
legislative organ (the Conseil), and an executive organ implementing the decisions of 
the legislative organ.10 Members of the Conseils are elected (Articles 8, 48 and 70 of 
law n°08/016); after their election, the Conseils representatives are appointed.11 
Conseils are empowered to take all administrative decisions and police regulations 
required by local interest, and permitted by the law.12 The executive organ is in 
charge of implementing the council's decisions.13 Members of the executive organ 
are elected by the Conseillers, and vested either by the Ministre de la République 
ayant les affaires intérieurs dans ses attributions or by the Governor of the Province 
(Articles 30, 56 of law n°08/016). 
 
The preamble of law n°08/016 contains a provision about the DTE's autonomy: it 
asserts the principle according to which executive bodies of DTE both represent the 
State and the province within their respective administrative districts.14 They are un-
                                                 
10  In towns villes, the deliberating council is called the Conseil urbain and the executive organ the 
Collège exécutif urbain (a 7 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008); in municipalities communes, the 
deliberating council is called the Conseil communal, and the executive organ the Collège exécutif 
communal (a 47 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008); in secteurs and chefferies, the deliberating 
council is called the Conseil de secteur ou de chefferie, and the executive organ the Collège 
exécutif de secteur ou de chefferie (a 69 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008). 
11  Maire and maire-adjoint in villes (a 29 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008): bourgmestre and 
bourgmestre-adjoint in communes (a 55 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008); Chef de secteur in 
secteurs and Chef de chefferie in chefferies are appointed according to the tradition (a 67 Law 
n°08/016 of 7 October 2008). 
12  Conseil urbain (aa 11 and 13 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008); Conseil communal (aa 50 and 
52 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008); Conseil de secteur ou de chefferie (a 73 Law n°08/016 of 7 
October 2008). 
13  Collège exécutif urbain (a 28 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008); Collège exécutif communal (a 54 
Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008); Collège exécutif du secteur ou de chefferie (a 78 Law 
n°08/016 of 7 October 2008). 
14  Principe de la représentation en même temps de l'Etat et de la Province par les autorités exécu-
tives des entités territoriales décentralisées. 
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der the trusteeship of the Governor of the province who supervises a priori and a 
posteriori the executive bodies' decisions.15 
 
In accordance with the principle of self-government and self-management of their 
human, economic, financial and technical resources stated in Article 3 of the Consti-
tution, the law provides for financial resources separate from those of the province.16 
Art. 115 of law n°08/016 states that DTEs are entitled to 40% of the national financial 
resources granted to the provinces. 
 
3.2 The real situation and disputed aspects 
 
There has been debate for a number of years on decentralisation and if DR Congo 
would not be better served by federal structures.17 Current issues include: 
 
3.2.1 The existing structure 
 
In reality there are still only 11 provinces. The reorganisation of the state territory has 
not yet taken place. 
 
The new Article 226 of the Constitution in effect indefinitely postpones implementa-
tion of the programme contained in Article 2 of the Constitution, i.e. the whole idea of 
dividing the country into 25 provinces as a major element of decentralisation. 
 
The dual position of the Governor as head of the province on the one hand and as 
the representative of the central government on the other hand becomes more deli-
cate having the revised versions of Articles 197 and 198 of the Constitution in mind, 
                                                 
15  L'autorité exécutive d'une entité territoriale décentralisée est placée sous la tutelle du Gouver-
neur de province. Il s'agit d'un contrôle a priori ou a posteriori sur les actes. 
16  Article 104 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008: Les finances d'une entité territoriale décentralisée 
sont distinctes de celles de la province. 
17  See for example Matthiesen Demokratische Republik Kongo; Mantuba-Ngoma (ed) Le proces-
sus de decentralization; Hamann 2005 ZaöRV 467 ff. 
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which do not define when a severe and persistent political crisis actually exists. This 
revision enlarges the power of the central government and casts doubt on whether or 
not there is a genuine desire to transfer powers.18 
 
A look at Congolese daily life reveals that the administrative structure is still largely 
centralised. For example: The state companies S.N.E.L (La Société Nationale 
d'Electricité) and Regideso (Regie de distribution d'eau) are solely responsible for 
the energy and water supply in the entire country. Both of them are under the man-
agement of the Ministry for Energy and the Ministry for the Portfolio.19 Les recteurs, 
the Presidents of the state's universities, are nominated and revoked by the Presi-
dent of the DRC. Judges and public prosecutors are also appointed centrally.20 
 
3.2.2 Traditional elements 
 
Integrating traditional elements in the political administrative and judicial structure 
can help to anchor state organisation in the population.21 Respecting and developing 
traditional elements might help to build up effective structures from the bottom up. Of 
course this requires a close look at the details and a sound understanding of such 
traditional elements in the various – very different – parts of DR Congo. 
 
3.2.3 Democratic participation or central control? 
 
                                                 
18  Mufundji Tshinat-Karl "La décentralisation"; Kapya Kabesa "Des contraintes liées à l'application"; 
Punga Kumakinga "Problématique de la Conformité" 93 ff. 
19  Ordinance n°78/196 of 5 May 1978. 
20  Articles 150, 152 of the Constitution; for further information see Mutonwa Kalombe "De l'organi-
sation".. 
21  An example is a 67 Law n°08/016 of 7 October 2008: "La chefferie est un ensemble générale-
ment homogène de communautés traditionnelles organisées sur base de la coutume et ayant à 
sa tête un Chef désigné par la coutume, reconnu et investi par les pouvoirs publics"; for the role 
of traditional courts see Mastaki Namegabe "Le droit au juge" 7 ff. 
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Maires and bourgmestres are appointed by the President. Local elections have not 
taken place. Elections at a local level are planned for the year 2013.22 Ethnicity may 
also have to be taken into account. 
 
Open questions are: When and with which effect will democratic elements exercised 
through local elections strengthen decentralised structures? Is there a political will-
ingness to establish such structures? KumbU ki Ngimbi comes to the following con-
clusion: 23 
 
Une prise de conscience voire une révolution mentale doit autant caractériser toute 
la population congolaise vis-à-vis des options levées dans le cadre de la gestion de 
la chose publique congolaise. Elle doit, toutes appartenances politiques confon-
dues, revendiquer par le biais légal les droits qui sont les siens et qui lui sont soit 
confisqués soit détournés à d'autres fins. La survie de la Nation en dépend. 
 
Mabiala Mantuba-Ngoma adds: 24 
 
Pour acquérir la culture de la décentralisation et les performances nécessaires à sa 
gestion, on a besoin d'une éducation permanente des cadres administratifs et des 
citoyens en général. 
 
3.2.4 Economic issues 
 
To balance central and regional powers it has to be kept in mind that many of the 
provinces of DR Congo are very rich in minerals and other natural resources. In ad-
dition, the country's energy and food supply also stems from the provinces, not from 
the capital. This does not make it easy to find the right balance between central 
power in the capital and decentralised power in the provinces and smaller decentral-
                                                 
22  For details on the legal framework for the elections see Law n°11/003 of 25 June 2011 – modi-
fiant et completant la loi n°06/006 du 09 mars 2006 portant organisation des élections présiden-
tielle, législatives, provinciales, urbaines, municipales et locales; Law n°11/014 of 17 August 
2011 – portant répartition des sièges par circonscription électorale pour les élections législatives 
et provinciales; Law n°06/006 of 9 March 2006 – portant organisation des élections présiden-
tielle, législatives, provinciales, urbaines, municipales et locales. 
23  Kumbu ki Ngimbi "Le cadre légal de la décentralisation" 83. 
24  Mantuba-Ngoma (ed) Le processus de decentralization 54. 
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ised entities. Organising independent financial resources of the provinces and other 
decentralised entities is part of the challenge. 
 
3.2.5 The vertical balance of power 
 
The economic issues referred to above do not facilitate the balance of power be-
tween the central state, the provinces, and other decentralised entities. The history 
of DR Congo does not make the task easier. 
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4 Rwanda 
 
4.1 The legal situation 
 
4.1.1 The constitutional framework 
 
The Constitution of 4 June 2003 states the following: 
 
Article 3 
The territory of Rwanda is divided into provinces, districts, cities, municipalities, 
towns, sectors and cells.  
The law determines the number, boundaries, organization and functioning of prov-
inces, cities, municipalities, towns and districts.  
 
Article 167 adds: 
 
Public administration shall be decentralized in accordance with the provisions of the 
law. Decentralized organs shall fall under the Ministry having local government in its 
functions. 
Districts, municipalities, towns and the City of Kigali are decentralized entities with 
legal status and administrative and financial autonomy and are the foundation of 
community development. 
They shall be entitled to become members of national and international organisa-
tions which promote development through decentralisation. 
A law determines the establishment, boundaries, functioning of and collaboration 
between these organs and various other organs which have a role in the admin-
istration and development of the country. A law shall also determine the manner in 
which the Government transfers powers property and other resources to decentral-
ized entities. 
 
4.1.2 Laws organising decentralisation 
 
Several laws and presidential orders have been enacted in accordance with the 
Constitution in order to implement decentralisation: 
- Organic law n°29/2005 of 23/12/2005 determining the administrative entities of 
the Republic of Rwanda; 
- law n°01/2006 of 24/01/2006 establishing the organisation and functioning of a 
province; 
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- law n°08/2006 of 24/02/2006 determining the organisation and functioning of a 
district; 
- presidential order n°57/01 of 15/10/2006 determining the structure and func-
tioning of village, cell and sector. 
-  
Rwanda's administrative system follows a pyramidal structure: The state is divided 
into provinces, subdivided into districts and composed of sectors; each sector is 
constituted of cells which are themselves divided into villages. 
 
4.1.2.1 Provinces 
 
The province "is an entity of the administration of the Republic of Rwanda. Its admin-
istration represents the State authority. It has financial autonomy in executing its 
budget" according to Article 2 of law n°01/2006 of 24 January 2006 establishing the 
organisation and functioning of a province. Provinces are administrated by three or-
gans, the Coordination Committee, the Governor, and the Executive Secretariat. Ar-
ticle 16 of law n°01/2006 states: 
 
The Governor of the Province is the representative of the Central Government in 
that Province and is in charge of coordinating the implementation of the Province's 
responsibilities. The Governor of the Province is answerable to the Minister in 
charge of Local Government. 
 
Article 17 of the same law pursues: 
 
The Governor of the Province is appointed by a Presidential Order upon approval 
by the Senate. He or she is removed from office by a Presidential Order upon ap-
proval of the Cabinet. 
 
The composition of the coordination committee is described in detail in Article 7. The 
executive secretary is appointed by an order of the prime minister (Article 29). 
 
The description of the province's missions is rather vague. According to Article 4 of 
law n°01/2006, the province is responsible to "coordinate planning related activities 
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in the Districts; supervise the implementation of the national policy in the Districts 
making up the Province; ensure the security of people and property". This broad 
scope of responsibilities gives provinces the right to interfere in the districts, i.e. in 
the local governments. Article 13 of law n°01/2006 stipulates that the Coordination 
Committee's minutes have to be submitted to the Minister in charge of Local Gov-
ernment, "with a copy thereof to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minis-
ter". The Coordination Committee's decisions are enforceable only after 30 days 
without hearing from the central government (Article 13). 
 
4.1.2.2 Districts 
 
According to Article 2 of law n°08/2006 determining the organisation and functioning 
of the district: 
 
The District is an autonomous administrative entity with a legal status with adminis-
trative and financial autonomy. Like other administrative entities, the District is an 
entity for the promotion of democracy and a basis for socio-economic development. 
 
It shall "support activities in which the population participates. In elaborating devel-
opment activities, the District shall endeavour to take its people's wishes into account 
and shall immediately coordinate all development activities in the District" (Article 6). 
 
The district is governed by 3 organs: The District Council, the Executive Committee 
and the Security Committee. Members of the District Council are – among others – 
Councillors elected at the level of sectors (Article 10 paragraph 1). Members of the 
Executive Committee are elected among the Councillors by the Councillors them-
selves (Article 12 paragraph 2). Article 17 of law n°08/2006 introduces a mechanism 
of participative democracy of the population: 
 
In case the local residents find that the councillor does not fulfil his or her duties ef-
fectively, they may forward it to the Council of the Sector for examination. Such a 
request is made in writing containing at least two hundred (200) names and, signa-
tures of the residents of the Sector with voting rights. Where he or she glinds it 
grounded, the Chairman of the Council of the Sector forwards it to the District 
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Council which examines and thereafter takes a decision. The councillor may also be 
suspended on his or her duties if requested in writing which is submitted to the 
Chairman of the District council. In that case, suspension of the councillor is con-
ducted in accordance with provisions of article 16 of this law. 
 
On the other hand Article 19 of law n°08/2006 states that "Members of Parliament 
have the right to attend District Council meetings and deliberate but without voting 
rights". Although members of the Parliament are not allowed to vote in District Coun-
cil meetings, their simple attendance may have an effect on local leaders. 
 
According to Article 78 of law n°08/2006 "The Chairperson of the Executive Commit-
tee who is the Mayor of the District represents the State in the District". The wording 
is similar to that used to describe the Governor of the province.25 
 
4.1.2.3 Sectors, cells and villages 
 
The organisation and the functioning of villages, cells and sectors are determined by 
presidential order n°57/01 of 15 October 2006 determining the structure and func-
tioning of villages, cells and sectors. 
 
Each village has a Council and an Executive Committee (Article 5). The "village 
council is comprised of all citizens residing in that village who are at least 18 years 
old" (Article 7). This village Council elects the Executive Committee (Article 8 para-
graph 1). 
 
Each cell has a Council, an Executive Committee, an Executive Secretariat and an 
Evaluation Committee (Article 26). "The Cell Council shall comprise of all residents 
of the Cell who have at least eighteen (18) years of age" (Article 27). The Cell Coun-
cil is the Supreme Cell Organ. It elects members of the Cell Executive Committee 
and may remove them (Article 28). Article 28 further states: 
                                                 
25  Article 16 Law n°01/2006 of 24 January 2006: "The Governor of the Province is the representa-
tive of the Central Government in that Province". 
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All decisions taken by the Cell Council must not contradict existing laws, Orders or 
Regulations or decisions taken by superior organs. 
 
A sector also has a Council. Sector Council Members "shall be credible persons of 
integrity whose services shall be voluntary" (Article 58 paragraph 1). They shall be 
elected for a mandate of five years (Article 58 paragraph 2). 
 
The Sector is bound to the District as far as its budget is concerned. Article 83 of 
Presidential order n°57/01 states that "the District allocates a budget from its annual 
budget for each Sector within the District to enable the Sector to achieve its respon-
sibilities". 
 
Immediately after the elections, members of the various Executive Committees shall 
take oath in front of the electorate.26 This procedure, as well as the fact that those 
Executive Committees members may be removed from office by a "vote of no confi-
dence" by the electorate27 makes them directly accountable to the local population. 
 
According to Article 87 of Presidential order n°57/01, "the Minister holding local Gov-
ernment within his/her responsibilities may issue instructions or assign other duties 
to administrative entities provided for in Article One of this Order with a view to en-
hancing good governance". 
 
                                                 
26  Article 17 (Villages), a 33 (Cells), a 59 (Sectors) Presidential Order n°57/01 of 15 October 2006. 
27  Article 19 (Villages), a 49 (Cells), a 69 para 4 (Sectors) Presidential Order n°57/01 of 15 October 
2006. 
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4.2 The real situation and disputed aspects 
 
4.1.1 The existing structure 
 
The country is divided up in accordance with the above-mentioned requirements of 
the associated laws complementing the Constitution regarding the organisation and 
role of administrative entities. The structures in place are in line with the legal provi-
sions. 
 
4.1.2 Traditional elements 
 
"Imihigo" agreements: The districts and the central government conclude perfor-
mance agreements on an annual basis. This enables the central government to 
closely monitor the realisation of the measures set out in the annual plan. It also 
makes sure that responsibility is taken seriously. 
 
In these agreements the districts undertake to implement the agreed measures on 
schedule. Whether and, if so, to what extent a district receives funds depends on – 
among other things – the extent to which it meets its obligations. 
 
Failure to achieve the agreed aims generally means that the person responsible is 
removed from office.28 
 
It is interesting to see that Rwandan administration refers to traditional means. This 
may help to anchor administration in the population and to create a feeling of re-
sponsibility and participation. Details are difficult to judge from the outside. 
 
4.1.2.1 Democratic participation or central control? 
                                                 
28  For more details see Scher Promise of Imihigo. 
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Once again it is difficult to judge from the outside. It is up to each country and its 
population to find the right mix between bottom-up elements and control mecha-
nisms. It will be interesting to monitor the effect of the population's participation in 
decision-making on the level of decentralised units and the consequences this may 
have on superior structures. 
 
From an external perspective, some of the detailed rules seem to be quite compli-
cated. How this will work in practice in the long run may also be an open issue. 
 
4.1.2.2 Economic aspects 
 
As always, sound judgement requires sufficient facts. This is not the purpose of this 
article. Nevertheless, the question of how the central state and its decentralised enti-
ties will finance themselves is central. What will the economic base of decentralised 
entities be in the long run, especially when aiming to become independent of foreign 
donors? What is the economic basis of each decentralised entity on the one hand 
and the central state on the other hand? 
 
4.1.2.3 The vertical balance of power 
 
Rwanda is a relatively small country. The size of the country is therefore not an ar-
gument for federal structures. A challenge may be how to balance the development 
of the capital Kigali and the development of rural areas. 
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5 Burundi 
 
5.1 The legal situation 
 
5.1.2 The constitutional framework 
 
The Constitution29 does not expressly proclaim the decentralised nature of the Bu-
rundian state but states the following in Article 3: 
 
Le Burundi est subdivisé en provinces, communes, zones et collines, et toutes 
autres subdivisions prévues par la loi. Leurs organisation et fonctionnement sont 
fixés par la loi. Elle peut en modifier les limites et le nombre. 
 
Article 88 adds: 
 
Les élections sont organisées de manière impartiale au niveau national, des com-
munes et des collines, ainsi qu'à d'autres niveaux fixés par la loi. 
 
Article 138 states: 
 
Le pouvoir exécutif est délégué, au niveau provincial, à un Gouverneur de province 
chargé de coordonner les services de l'administration œuvrant dans la province. 
Le Gouverneur de province exerce, en outre, les pouvoirs que les lois et les règle-
ments lui attribuent. 
 
Followed by Article 139: 
 
Le Gouverneur de province doit être burundais civil, natif, établi ou ressortissant de 
l'entité territoriale qu'il est appelé à administrer. 
Il est nommé par le Président de la République après consultation avec les Vice-
Présidents de la République et confirmation par le Sénat. 
 
                                                 
29  Constitution of Burundi of 2005 (Law n°1/010 of 18 March 2005). 
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Articles 262 to 265 provide for the organisation of the collectivités locales and refer 
to an additional loi organique. The commune is explicitly described as a decentral-
ised administrative entity (Article 263). 
 
5.1.3 Laws organising decentralisation 
 
The Burundian administrative organisation is ruled by the Constitution and law 
n°1/016 of 20 April 200530 modified by law n°1/02 of 25 January 201031 organising 
the communal entities.32 
 
5.1.3.1 The Provinces 
 
According to Articles 3, 138 and 13933 of the Constitution, Burundi is divided into 
provinces, each ruled by a Governor in charge of coordinating the central govern-
ment's activities within the province, through a delegation of the executive power. He 
is appointed by the President. 
 
5.1.3.2 The Communes 
 
Article 1 of law n°1/016 of 20 April 2005 modified by law n°1/02 of 25 January 2010 
states: 
 
La commune est une collectivité territoriale décentralisée, dotée de la personnalité 
juridique, de l'autonomie organique et financière. 
 
                                                 
30  Law n°1/016 of 20 April 2005 . 
31  Law n°1/02 of 25 January 2010 revising Law n°1/016 of 20 April 2005 organising the communal 
administration. 
32  For more details see Ngabonziza "La décentralisation communale au Burundi" 46 ff. 
33  Article 139 al 2 Constitution of Burundi of 2005: "Il est nommé par le Président de la République 
après consultation avec les Vice-Présidents de la République et confirmation par le Sénat". 
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The Burundian communes are responsible for managing local interests and adminis-
tering public services.34 The following bodies assist the communes in fulfilling its 
tasks:  
- The Conseil municipal 
Members of the Conseil municipal are elected by direct universal suffrage for 5 
years. A Bureau responsible for getting the Communes business done (voting on the 
budget, creating and organising local public services, etc.) is composed of a Prési-
dent, a Vice-Président, and a Secrétaire (Article 9 of law n°1/02). After their elections 
and at its first meeting the members of the Conseil municipal elect the Président, the 
Vice-Président and the Administrateur communal, who is de jure the Secretary (Arti-
cle 11). Artcile 1535 organises a participative democratic mechanism: the Conseil 
communal holds twice-yearly meetings with representatives from the collines and 
local associations, where they expose the political, social and economic situation of 
the Commune, and where each participant can ask questions and propose solutions. 
According to Article 1836, the Governor of the province is free to attend any meeting 
of the Conseil communal and to be listened to. The Conseil communal has to ad-
dress every decision to the Administrateur communal and to the province's Governor 
(Article 21). 
- The Administrateur communal 
According to Art. 25 et seq, the Administrateur communal represents the Commune. 
As such, he takes all of the decisions required in order to implement the decisions of 
the Conseil communal. But at the same time, the Administrateur communal also rep-
                                                 
34  Article 5 Law n°1/02 of 25 January 2010: "La commune est chargée de la gestion des intérêts 
locaux de la population de son ressort. Elle assure les services publics répondant aux besoins 
de cette population et qui ne relèvent pas, par leur nature, leur importance ou par détermination 
de la loi, de la responsabilité directe de l'Etat. L'Etat peut lui déléguer la gestion ou l'exécution, 
sur le plan local, de certaines des missions qui lui incombent. Dans ce cas, il met à sa disposition 
les ressources humaines, matérielles et financières nécessaires." 
35  Article 15 Law n°1/02 of 25 January 2010: "Le Conseil communal organise au moins deux fois 
par an des rencontres ouvertes aux conseils de collines et aux représentants des associations 
œuvrant dans la commune pour les informer de manière transparente sur la situation politique, 
sociale et économique prévalant dans la commune et les perspectives d'avenir. Les participants 
ont droit de poser des questions et de proposer des solutions au Conseil communal." 
36  Article 18 Law n°1/02 of 25 January 2010: "Le Gouverneur de Province, le Maire ou leurs délé-
gués peuvent assister aux séances du Conseil communal sans voix délibérative. Il doit être en-
tendu chaque fois qu'il le demande." 
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resents the central government (Article 26). As such, he has a general policing pow-
er and a supervising power upon agents of the central government appointed in the 
Commune (Article 27). 
 
According to Article 96, decisions of the Commune are first controlled by the Gover-
nor of the province, and then by the Minister in charge of the local administration. 
 
5.1.3.3 Further entities 
 
According to Article 3 of law n° 1/16, the Commune rural is subdivided into zones 
and collines de recensement. The Commune urbaine is subdivided into zones and 
quartiers. 
 
5.2 The real situation and disputed aspects 
 
5.1.1 The existing structure 
 
The structures provided by the laws described above have been put in place.37 
 
5.1.2 Traditional elements 
 
I asked a Burundian colleague: do the communes follow traditional structures? The 
answer was "no". The way the provinces are divided into Communes has been de-
cided in the capital. It does not necessarily follow traditional, historically grown struc-
tures. The law expresses this in Article 1 paragraph 2 of loi n°1/02: in providing that 
Communes are created through "une loi organique qui en fixe la dénomination, le 
chef-lieu et les limites".  
 
                                                 
37  For more details see Ngabonziza "La décentralisation communale au Burundi". 
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Although this is just a detail, it is – to my mind – an important detail because it shows 
that it is essential to take a very close look when trying to understand the structure of 
the country from the outside. If the process were based on traditional structures the 
population would be more likely to accept the process and be more willing to take an 
active role in it. 
 
Among the topics often discussed you will find "Ubushingantahe," which is a tradi-
tional means of organising society.38 
 
The question is if and how traditional principles of organisation and traditional values 
can be used to develop modern structures which are solidly anchored in Burundian 
society. 
 
5.1.3 Democratic participation or central control? 
 
Given the capacity of the central state and the provinces to influence decisions at a 
lower level the question remains as to how much room for self-administration and 
democratic initiative will remain for the population.39 In this context it can also be 
asked if the election law in place helps democratic participation at a decentralised 
level or not.40 
 
Another topic to ponder is impunity. Is there a link between impunity and establishing 
rule-of-law structures? Most of the ethnically motivated crimes committed in Burundi 
in the last decade have not been punished. This seems to be an obstacle to open-
minded self-organisation at all levels of the state structure.41 
 
                                                 
38  Ngabonziza "La décentralisation communale au Burundi" 53; Nindorera Ubushingantahe.. 
39  For more details see Ngabonziza "La décentralisation communale au Burundi" 57 ff. 
40  Ngabonziza "La décentralisation communale au Burundi" 60. 
41  See Hamann and Berger "Burundi"; Niyonkuru "L'indépendance du pouvoir judicaire Burundais" 
1 ff.; Didier Nibogora "La place du droit pénal" 66 ff. 
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Nevertheless, Désiré Ngabonziza comes to the following conclusion:42 
 
Comme nous venons de le voir, la décentralisation est un mode de gouvernement 
des communes au Burundi et elle est en marche. Elle connaît certes des difficultés 
de fonctionnement dues en partie à la nouveauté de ce système. En effet, à la ma-
nière d'un enfant qui naît et qui apprend progressivement à marcher, avec beau-
coup de difficultés, le système marche et évolue. 
 
5.1.4 Economic issues 
 
Are there sufficient financial resources for the decentralised structures?43 And are 
there sufficient financial resources for the state as a whole? How are these re-
sources allocated? Among the major exported resources of Burundi are coffee and 
tea, which are produced in the rural areas and not in the capital. This economic issue 
is part of a larger problem: in the long term, how will Burundi assure its independ-
ence from donor money? Ethnic and political rivalry for access to resources may also 
be an issue.44 Corruption is also an issue: Burundi is placed 172 out of 177 on the 
Transparency International Index 2011, far behind Rwanda (place 49) and worse 
than DR Congo (place 168).45 
 
5.1.5 The vertical balance of power 
 
Like Rwanda, Burundi is a relatively small country. Finding the balance between the 
capital where all important decisions are made and the rural areas where products 
for export are produced and which supply food and energy might not be easy. 
 
                                                 
42  Ngabonziza "La décentralisation communale au Burundi" 64. 
43  For more details see Ngabonziza "La décentralisation communale au Burundi" 56 ff.  
44  For more details on ethnically motivated elements of the Burundian Constitution see Manirakiza 
"L'approche consociative" 91 ff. 
45  Transparency International 2011 www.transparency.org. 
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6 International law and decentralisation 
 
The article confines itself to a couple of questions.46 
 
6.1 Looking in from the outside 
 
6.1.1 International organisations 
 
The World Bank/IMF/UN generally communicates with governments, i.e. with central 
powers. Do they – in so doing – reinforce a centralised system of government? Can 
they or could they bring pressure in such a way that a centralised power would hand 
over part of its power? 
 
Can or could they have sufficient influence so that the population would take the ini-
tiative itself and assume more responsibility for running its own affairs? Is that the 
intention? 
 
6.1.2 Regional integration 
 
In Africa, regional communities are playing an increasingly important role. For the 
three countries which I am using as examples – DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi – 
the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the African Union (AU) are of special importance. Regional integration 
will be sustainable only if it has the support of the population concerned. This pre-
supposes that the population can identify with the structures to which it is submitted. 
This will work better if people are able to influence it. Once again: structures which 
do not work at local, provincial and national level have little chance of international 
success. Establishing decentralised government structures at local, municipal and 
                                                 
46  For more details see Hamann and Schroth 2011 VRÜ; Hamann "Great Lakes Region, Africa". 
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provincial level can encourage acceptance if these decentralised structures have the 
support of the population concerned and if people have a say in how they are run. 
 
6.1.3 International cooperation 
 
There are good reasons why German development policy fosters decentralisation. 
The definition of decentralisation used by the German Ministry for economic co-
operation is not all that different from the definition which I have used above. Ger-
man development work defines decentralisation as the transfer of tasks, responsibili-
ties, resources and political decision-making to the middle level (e.g. provinces, dis-
tricts, regions) and the lower level (towns, communes, villages).47 As soon as an ex-
ternal agency or organisation influences the decentralisation process the funds pro-
vided by these external players will have an effect. The effect of a measure of this 
type depends on numerous details which determine the situation in which the re-
sources are used. In my experience this can be achieved only gradually and with 
great patience by collaborating with partners on the ground. It is not easy to find an 
answer to the question of what should be achieved. Are such measures meant to 
encourage and strengthen a sense of responsibility and participation among the local 
population from the bottom up? This involves the political will to do so in the first 
place, and a willingness to trigger a process of change and follow it through. 
Measures which simply cement an unconvincing status quo are contra-productive. 
To my mind, preserving such a status quo is the opposite of development. 
 
6.2 Looking at the situation from the inside 
 
As a European I have no right to speak on behalf of Africans. An African country's 
view of the measures and funds provided by the World Bank/IMF/UN organisations 
and donor countries must be formulated by the African country itself. Over the past 
one-and-a-half years I have had a number of opportunities to work with groups of 
                                                 
47  Bundesministerium Dezentralisierung 4. 
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young African diplomats from 20 to 25 different African countries. I have also had a 
number of opportunities to work with postgraduate students from many African coun-
tries. At these events whenever I asked: What do you expect of Europe? I always got 
the same answer: 
- A fair economic partnership; not in addition to but instead of the usual devel-
opment aid; 
- Support in developing production and technical know-how and good training 
opportunities. 
 
I realise that these statements are not necessarily representative. But they give me 
the opportunity to express some thoughts on decentralisation and economic devel-
opment. 
- Development presupposes a sound, independent economic basis. An econom-
ic basis must evolve within the country itself, first and foremost in food production 
and energy supply. In both of these fields the potential nearly always lies in the prov-
inces and not in the capital city, i.e. in decentralised structures. 
- A country's independent economic basis can be developed only from the bot-
tom up. In countries where the average age of the population is very low, it is essen-
tial to use the enthusiasm and energy of these young people. Probably there is also 
an important link with decentralisation: if decentralisation really does mean a genuine 
shift of power away from centralised organisation and towards greater personal re-
sponsibility and involvement, it can also provide economic impulses. In other words: 
a rural village community which organises its own power supply, water supply and 
infrastructure and which can intensify and expand agricultural production and trade 
in the products which it generates will create an economic basis which will make 
economic growth possible. Establishing production facilities to process natural re-
sources in order to create added value within the country will also have to take into 
account the geographical position of such natural resources which in general are not 
found in the capital. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Decentralisation can make a positive contribution to reinforcing rule-of-law structures 
if it is genuinely wanted and actively promotes individual initiative, responsibility and 
accountability among the population. 
 
Existing structures can be developed or changed only where there is a thorough un-
derstanding of the existing structures, including customs and traditions. 
 
Development means change. If decentralisation is to encourage development there 
must be a willingness to change. This willingness to promote and accept change 
must exist within the country itself but also among decision-making authorities from 
outside. 
 
An essential element in processes of growth and change which will be initiated by 
the people themselves is an economic basis. Self-sufficiency in energy supply and 
food production is an important factor and is based not in the capital city but in the 
provinces. The use of the natural resources of a country in the interest of the whole 
population is another major factor. 
 
If outside agencies wish to provide funding and support projects to encourage and 
promote decentralisation and rule-of-law structures, they should also have the cour-
age to foster processes of change. 
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